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Abstract 
China, India, and South Africa have recognized the importance of renewable electricity for 
their future development. In this paper, we investigate the experience of the three 
countries in applying generation-based policies to promote renewable electricity. In 
contrast to the European experience, which proposes feed-in tariffs as the most successful 
policy to promote renewable electricity generation, emerging economies show strong 
interest in little acknowledged auction-based tariffs. We explore how and why different 
generation-based policies for solar photovoltaic (PV) are applied, as well as what their 
prospects are. Our comparison highlights the importance of policy objectives on policy 
choice and design. All three emerging economies need to promote electricity from 
renewables while keeping electricity prices low. Hence, they are experimenting with 
policies and design options and arriving at country specific solutions. Despite applying 
different policy instruments and designs that put strong emphasis on low-cost solutions, all 
three countries seem able to reach their ambitious deployment targets. 
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1 Introduction 
Electricity generation in most countries today heavily relies on fossil fuels. This reliance 
on fossil fuels entails a number of risks. On the one hand, the earth’s finite natural 
resources make countries increasingly vulnerable to volatile international markets. On 
the other, this dependence exposes them and everyone else to the risks of climate 
change. Fossil fuels continue to be used and promoted because they are said to be 
cheaper than renewables. However, the cost advantages of fossil fuels over renewables 
disappear as soon as the externalized risks are considered and a long-term perspective is 
taken. Markets are weak in doing this; hence, proactive government support is needed to 
promote renewables and the green electricity sector (Ellis / Baker / Lemma 2009, 55–57; 
WBGU 2011). 
Greening the electricity sectors of emerging economies is particularly important and 
challenging. First, economic growth is strongly correlated with electricity demand (Yoo / 
Lee 2010), which entails the danger of greater fossil fuel dependence, but also the chance 
to instigate the deployment of renewable energy (WBGU 2011). Second, emerging 
countries have limited capacities to respond to major external shocks (Naudé / Santos-
Paulino 2009). Risks from fossil-fuel dependence and climate change are therefore much 
more substantial for these countries. Hence, encouraging an early transition to electricity 
from renewable energy is decisive to exploit their mitigation potential and to contain 
climate and resource risks. For this purpose, massive amounts of renewable energy 
installations are needed. However, as electricity is central to development, additional costs 
from a transition to renewables are a socially and politically sensitive issue, which 
underscores the need for smart policies that encourage installations at reasonable prices. 
Emerging economies are increasingly adopting policies to promote the deployment of 
renewable electricity technologies. In doing so, they seemingly ignore the alleged 
superiority of feed-in tariffs (FITs), the importance of investment security, and other 
lessons learned in Europe’s two-decade experience with generation-based renewable 
policies. Why is this so, and are these policies doomed to fail? To answer this, we bring 
together theoretical considerations on the policies and the European experience, paying 
particular attention to two aspects, deployment success and policy costs. On basis of this 
conventional knowledge, we analyze three country cases, China, India, and South Africa, 
and compare their experience in promoting solar photovoltaic (PV).1 
2 Generation-based policies for renewable electricity 
This chapter provides a review of the two most prominent generation-based incentives: 
feed-in tariffs and their tender-based equivalent, which we refer to as auction-based tariffs 
(ABTs). Despite the popularity of FITs, no common understanding of what constitutes 
FITs can be found in the literature. We start by defining FITs and distinguishing them 
from ABTs. In a further step, we reflect on the theory and empirics of the two instruments 
with a focus on deployment success and policy costs.  
                                                            
1  Note that we focus on on-grid deployment rather than off-grid installations, for which solar PV 
technology is already competitive in many cases (Müller / Brown / Ölz 2011, 56; Thiam 2010).  
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Feed-in tariffs and auction-based tariffs 
Existing definitions of FITs are at best vague and do not correspond with each other. 
There is little agreement of what the constituent features of a FIT are. The central 
characteristic present in all understandings is that FITs provide generation-based 
incentives for electricity generation from selected energy sources or technologies (e. g. 
Couture / Gagnon 2010; Kreycik / Couture / Cory 2011; Lipp, 2007; Mendonca / Jacobs / 
Sovacool 2010). Several authors have put forward additional criteria like technology-
specificity, fixed payment periods, or purchase guarantees. However, from our point of 
view, such criteria artificially limit the analytical scope and should, therefore, not be 
included into the basic definition of FITs. 
In addition to the diversity of FIT definitions, the relationship between FITs and auctions 
is often unclear. While auctions, in the form of tenders, are used to determine and allocate 
generation-based payments for generated electricity, they are generally not referred to as 
FITs (e. g. Couture / Gagnon 2010; Kreycik / Couture / Cory 2011; Mendonca / Jacobs / 
Sovacool 2010; Müller / Brown / Ölz 2011). However, the financial support schemes of 
FITs and their auction-based equivalents resemble each other. The two support schemes 
only differ in how payment rates or tariffs are determined. To be specific, policies with 
tariffs predetermined by policymakers via rules and regulations are commonly subsumed 
under the term FIT. Policies with tariffs determined through auctions are referred to as 
ABTs throughout this paper. 
 Feed-in tariff Auction-based tariff 
Alternative terms Standard Offer Contracts,  Advanced Renewable Tariffs 
Renewable tenders, tendering 
systems, competitive biddings 
Definition 
• Generation-based payment for 
electricity, 
• predetermined by policymakers and 
constantly available to project 
developers. 
• Generation-based payment for 
electricity, 
• determined and allocated through 
auction-based tenders in which 
project developers compete. 
Competing policy objectives 
Accelerated deployment has been hailed as the success of policies applied in Germany, 
Spain, and other countries (Mendonca / Jacobs / Sovacool 2010). However, there is 
growing concern over the policy costs associated with accelerated deployment and 
whether these costs are above the levels needed to achieve the accelerated deployment 
(Batlle / Pérez / Zambrano-Barrangán 2012). Depending on the competitiveness of 
different Renewable energy technology (RETs), supporting electricity generation can be 
quite costly. These costs are borne either by the tax payer, if FITs function as subsidies, 
or by the electricity consumer, if costs are passed on via electricity bills. Consequently, 
we consider accelerated deployment of renewables and low electricity costs as 
competing policy objectives. Generation-based policies are to facilitate accelerated 
deployment of RETs while policy costs are to be limited (OECD / IEA 2008). The 
relative weight attributed to these competing objectives influences the choice and design 
of policy instruments. 
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Feed-in tariffs versus auction-based tariffs: theory and practice 
Real-world policies for RET deployment often differ from recommendations based on 
economic theory. While the latter proposes that market mechanisms, and thus ABTs, are 
more efficient than regulatory approaches, such as FITs, the deployment success of FITs 
in Europe hints at their supremacy.  
There is no theoretical argument why either FITs or ABTs should be more successful with 
respect to accelerating RET deployment, provided that FITs are set high enough to 
encourage investment and ABTs auction the necessary volume of installations. ABTs also 
guarantee that support is provided efficiently as tariffs emerge from a competitive bidding 
process amongst investors with full knowledge of their costs and risks 
(Kreycik / Couture / Cory 2011, 25 f.). Correspondingly, FITs are efficient if tariff-setting 
policymakers have full information about the investors’ cost structures and set tariffs 
accordingly.  
However, FITs involve risks for policymakers that ABTs do not due to informational 
asymmetry between principal (policymaker) and agent (investor) (Lesser / Su 2008, 985–
988; Lipp 2007, 5483). In an urge to provide for sufficient incentives and in light of 
constantly falling RET costs, tariff rates can easily lead to an overcompensation of 
investors (Gupta et al. 2007, 762; Kreycik / Couture / Cory 2011, 1–2). If policymakers 
fail to adapt tariff rates timely and sufficiently, the number of projects and the payments 
they receive increase sharply, rendering FITs inefficient.  
On the other hand, European countries have instituted different generation-based incentives 
and found FITs are superior to auction-based ones: Deployment levels in countries with 
auctions, such as France, Ireland, or the United Kingdom, lag behind those that have 
employed FITs, Germany and Spain being the prime examples (Mendonca 2007; 
Mendonca / Jacobs / Sovacool 2010; OECD / IEA 2008). Comparing the auction 
mechanism in the UK and Germany’s FIT, Butler / Neuhoff (2008) show that the latter not 
only resulted in more deployment but also posed less costs to the customer. 
What practical arguments are brought forward for FITs? First of all, FITs are praised for 
the investment security2 they create and the resulting effectiveness in accelerating 
deployment (Haselip 2011; OECD / IEA 2008, 100–105). Support that is constantly 
accessible and not limited to specific bidding windows improves the investor’s ability to 
plan ahead, thereby limiting investment risks. For FITs to be financially attractive, returns 
on investment just have to exceed opportunity costs (profits) of other investments. FITs 
are therefore likely to attract a large amount of investment and facilitate accelerated 
deployment of the targeted RETs.3 In addition, the constant support and uninterrupted 
                                                            
2  Dinica (2006) argues that policies need to be assessed from an investor’s perspective; reducing risks by 
creating investment security is essential. The risk premium investors ask for drops as a result, thus 
allowing deployment acceleration at the lowest cost possible. This view is now echoed in many 
discussions on generation-based incentives (e. g. Butler / Neuhoff 2008; Kreycik / Couture / Cory 2011; 
Mendonca / Jacobs / Sovacool 2010). 
3  This particularly applies to cost-covering feed-in tariffs that factor in costs related to investment, 
administration, operation, and maintenance, and simultaneously provide for a ‘reasonable’ rate of return 
(Mendonca / Jacobs / Sovacool 2010, 19–25; Ragwitz / Huber 2004, 3–4). 
Bastian Becker / Doris Fischer 
4 German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE) 
investment flow are expected to have a lasting positive effect on innovation systems and 
attached industries.  
The failure of ABTs to significantly accelerate deployment in several European countries 
has mainly been attributed to the auction mechanism itself. By appointing capacities only 
within specific time frames and by obliging investors to stick to defined milestones, ABTs 
distort the natural investment flow. This tidal support destabilizes the manufacturing 
industry and its innovative power (Butler / Neuhoff 2008, 1863; Kreycik / Couture / Cory 
2011, 32–33). Also, competitive bidding can encourage adventurous bids that are 
financially not viable and lead to a large number of scheduled projects not being realized 
(Kreycik / Couture / Cory 2011, 25 f.; Mendonca 2007, 15). However, if investors seek to 
position themselves in growth markets and move their businesses along technological 
learning curves, auctions pressure investors to be moderate on their expected profits. In 
order to secure a move into the market, some might even consider a short-term loss and 
hence contribute to the high front-up costs needed to make renewable electricity 
technologies competitive. Last but not least, auctions advantage large companies, which 
are more capable than small ones to cross-subsidize low bids and to cope with high 
transaction costs that precede and accompany tenders (Kreycik / Couture / Cory 2011, 32). 
This also hinders new, potentially innovative firms from entering the market, and can 
thereby undermine the industry’s long-term innovative capacity (Couture 2010).  
The role of different policy design options 
The success of generation-based policies does not exclusively depend on the way 
generation-based incentives are determined. The design of the support scheme itself is at 
least as important. In this, FITs and ABTs are very similar. They basically have the same 
design options. The most important ones are discussed here. 
Guarantees are central to the functioning of generation-based policies. First, investors 
need to receive purchase guarantees to assure that all generated electricity will be bought. 
Without this, utilities are likely to continue using established, conventionally produced 
electricity (Mendonca / Jacobs / Sovacool 2010, 27–30). Second, in order to assess the 
long-term return on the investment, investors need to know for what time they can expect 
to receive favourable treatment. Guaranteed durations are thus a key component of 
generation-based policies that aim to enfold high investment security.  
Caps and price ceilings can limit excessive policy costs. Quantity-based auctions, where 
capacities are necessarily predetermined, imply a ceiling for the otherwise flexible price. 
Such starting prices are common in auctions. For price-based FITs, the opposite can be 
done – the cap is put upon the offered capacity. This latter system has been proposed as 
cost-cutting option for developing countries (Kreycik / Couture / Cory 2011, 8–10; 
Mendonca / Jacobs / Sovacool 2010, 68–69). Once this capacity cap is reached, no 
additional projects are admitted to the scheme. However, capped feed-in tariffs, like 
ABTs, disrupt investment cycles, thereby limiting the investment security created.  
The selection of supported RETs is decisive in many ways. Figure 1, with data for China, 
shows that electricity generation costs differ significantly from one technology to another. 
In order to promote a diverse electricity mix, it is necessary to support different renewable 
Promoting renewable electricity generation in emerging economies 
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Figure 1: Levelized costs of electricity generation in China 
 
Source: IEA / NEA 2010 
technologies separately (Mendonca / Jacobs / Sovacool 2010, 16–17). The World Bank 
(2010, 44) has argued that developing countries should appoint only one general tariff 
scheme for renewables in order to make sure that the cheapest RETs are brought in first. 
In contrast to this argument, the three countries discussed here – China, India, and South 
Africa – have opted for technology-specific schemes, seeking to support different RETs 
from early on. Later in this paper, we look at the promotion of solar PV, a technology that 
still depends decisively on targeted support due to its lack of competitiveness. 
The eligibility of investors is often limited through financial, technological and other 
selection criteria. Financial criteria are to assure that developers have the means to execute 
their projects. Technology criteria may be invoked to exclude technologies that have not 
proven feasible. Last but not least, local content requirements promote the development of 
domestic industries. Financial and, to some extent, technological criteria can instigate 
policy effectiveness. The effects of selection criteria depend on the policy instrument. For 
ABTs, selection criteria imply a limitation of competition and can thereby negatively 
impact efficiency and the achievement of low-cost objectives. Serving as a safeguard 
against unviable offers, such criteria can, however, foster the accelerated RET 
deployment. Selection criteria naturally have no influence on the price level of FITs. Their 
effectiveness in accelerating deployment is, however, reduced if investors who would 
have otherwise participated in the scheme are not eligible anymore. 
Sanctions are important features of auctions. While they can be applied to FITs, they are 
not common, as project developers usually only register when their installations are 
completed. Auctions naturally appoint limited capacities of support before installations are 
realised. In making sure winning projects are executed, sanctions and deadlines play a 
crucial role. They do, however, constitute an additional risk for developers and can thus 
make policies less attractive and/or more expensive. 
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Beyond Europe 
What can countries make of the experience and knowledge gained on different generation-
based incentives? The European experience proposes FITs as the most successful policy to 
promote renewable electricity generation. Emerging countries that have recently shown an 
increased interest in renewable electricity sources, however, are experimenting with 
different schemes. While predetermined FITs are applied, they do not appear to play a 
dominant role. In the following sections, we explore how and why different generation-
based policies for solar PV are applied, and what their prospects are.   
3 China: preparing for the great push? 
China’s fast industrialization and economic development has increased energy demand by 
more than 12 times within less than 20 years (Kahrl et al. 2011, 4033). In order to meet the 
growing needs of the economy, electricity production capacity was increased to 962 
Gigawatt (GW) as of 2010 (CREIA / ERI 2011). Although the expanded capacity provides 
99.4 % of China’s population with access to electricity (IEA 2010), electricity shortages 
still occur regularly at peak times in summer. Further expansion of electricity supply to 
overcome this problem and to support further economic development is important; 
consequently, the IEA (2011, 594) anticipates that China’s installed electricity capacity 
will rise to about 1,700 GW by 2020. The abundance of coal reserves within the country 
has facilitated the generation of affordable electricity; today, two thirds of China’s 
electricity comes from coal-fired plants. Coal is thus a major contributor to the high levels 
of air pollution and green-house gas emissions within the country. 
China’s plans for future electricity generation increasingly emphasize the importance of 
RETs as a way of meeting additional demand without further environmental strain. Target 
levels for RET deployment underwent several upward revisions in recent years, and the 
latest target formulated in the 12th Five-Year Plan (2011–2015) raises the share of 
renewable electricity in total generation capacities to one third by 2020.4 Solar PV 
installations are expected to grow to 10 GW by 2015 and 50 GW by 2020 (Martinot 2010; 
Fischer 2012). From 2010 to 2020, solar PV installations are thus expected to make up 
6.8 % of total electricity capacity additions. Through these efforts, the Chinese 
government expects to reach grid parity for solar PV as early as 2015 (REM 2011).  
The Chinese government continues to facilitate its economic development by capping 
retail prices for electricity, which averaged about 0.06€ / kilowatt-hour (kWh) in 2009 
(SERC 2010). While cautious about rising electricity prices, the government is eager to 
exploit the benefits from the deployment of RETs in terms of environmental protection, 
energy security and climate change mitigation.  
Solar PV, China’s unwanted child 
In contrast to wind turbines, solar PV did previously not play a major role in government 
plans to expand RET deployment. With a total of 160 Megawatt (MW) installed capacity 
                                                            
4  China includes conventional large hydro power in its definition of renewable energy. 
Promoting renewable electricity generation in emerging economies 
German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE) 7 
in 2009, on-grid solar PV deployment was at a nascent stage (Martinot 2010, 8). 
Previously, the government had been reluctant to push solar PV installations for a number 
of reasons. First, solar PV was more expensive than other RETs. Second, solar PV relied 
on (at that time expensive) raw material input (purified silicon), machinery and other input 
technologies from abroad, and therefore was not attractive in terms of enhancing energy 
security. 
The reluctance to expand solar PV deployment stood in sharp contrast with the 
development of China’s manufacturing industry, which reached an annual solar PV cell 
production capacity of 13.5 GW in 2010 (Li / Wang 2011, 36). Due to the successful 
stimulation of solar PV installations in such markets as Germany, Spain, and the US, 
Chinese solar PV production almost exclusively focused on exports. Making use of cost 
advantages, process innovations and economies of scale, the country became, within less 
than ten years, the world’s major supplier of solar PV panels (Rigter / Vidican 2010, 
6990). In 2010, Chinese manufacturers managed to serve more than 50 % of the global 
market (EPIA 2011, 36).  
Before 2011, China had only very modest support schemes for solar PV deployment in 
place, as scepticism prevailed whether comparatively expensive solar energy (see 
Figure 1) should be supported for on-grid electricity generation. Starting in 2007, the 
central government experimented with support schemes that differed with respect to 
eligible project sizes and in the way prices were determined (CREIA / ERI 2011). Two 
different support schemes were employed for large-scale solar PV plants. First, for some 
projects suggested by local governments and approved by the central government, the 
electricity price was set by China’s National Development and Reform Commission 
(NDRC) at 0.445€/kWh5 for projects approved in 2007. Projects approved by the NDRC 
in 2010 received only an average support of 0.128€/kWh. This lower support level partly 
reflected the fast decrease of solar PV cell and module production costs after 2008, but 
was also a signal to the industry that efficiency was a priority in RET deployment (The 
Climate Group 2011; CREIA / ERI 2011). Second, the government initiated tenders for 
solar PV plant investment and management licenses (25 years) with the electricity 
generation payment being determined on basis of a competitive bidding process. Two 
major tenders were organized in 2009 and 2010, which resulted in even lower tariffs, 
ranging from 0.081 to 0.121€/kWh. These low tariff rates were partly the result of the 
overproduction in the Chinese solar PV industry, which had been caused by the large 
number of manufacturers entering the market (RICCLCE 2011). 
A feed-in tariff to compensate for a stagnating global market 
Most support schemes for solar PV that emerged in 2009 or later were intended to 
compensate the domestic industry for the repercussions of the global financial crisis and 
the reduction of solar PV support in major foreign markets. However, against this 
backdrop, policies did not seek to encourage additional production and installations 
through extensive support schemes. Quite the contrary, the government put a lot of 
pressure on project developers to accept low price levels for on-grid solar PV (interview, 
                                                            
5  Annual exchange rate (2011), applied here and in the following: 1EUR = 8.9944CNY (European 
Central Bank 2012). 
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Chinese project developer 2011).6 The generation prices resulting from tenders and those 
set by the NDRC were, however, deemed too low by the industry to be economically 
viable. Indeed, they were significantly lower than FITs already offered by some provincial 
support schemes. As a result, actual installations fell short of contractual volumes and 
frequently suffered low quality (interview information, different industry representatives 
2011; The Climate Group 2011).  
In 2011, the Chinese government finally introduced a nation-wide FIT for solar PV 
(NDRC 2011). Generation payments were set just above the level of previous tenders. 
Projects approved before July 2011 were to receive 0.128€/kWh for their generated 
electricity. All projects approved later are to obtain a generation price of 0.111€/kWh with 
the exception of projects in Tibet that are still eligible for the FIT’s initial rate. While 
earlier regulation guarantees that all renewable electricity has to be purchased by utilities 
(SERC 2007), no guaranteed duration for the preferential FIT payment was specified in 
the policy document. Industry representatives, however, expect stable support for 
approved projects for 25 years (interview with Chinese project developer 2011). The 
policy stipulates that the FIT will be adjusted in the future in accordance with investment 
trends and technology developments. Project-specific tenders are allowed along the new 
scheme, but the scheme’s tariff level serves as a general price ceiling. The FIT is financed 
by an additional fee paid by consumers through their electricity bill in accordance with the 
Renewable Energy Act. The FIT is not available for building-integrated and rooftop 
installations supported by other government programmes, which therefore already receive 
investment support from government budgets. Developers of building-integrated and 
rooftop installations hence have to rely on generation payments equalling the local 
aggregate price for electricity from desulphurized coal. 
While the nationwide FIT was welcomed by the solar PV industry, the tariff level was 
criticized for a number of reasons. First, the FIT only provided sufficient incentives for 
solar PV installations in the western regions of China, where solar radiation is high and 
land prices low, but the FIT was too low for the eastern parts of the country, where 
electricity demand is highest. Second, the FIT does not create sufficient investment 
security as many details were left open – from the lack of a guaranteed tariff duration to 
the possibility of regional top-ups to the FITs, which industry experts expected after the 
publication of the FIT rules (Zhou 2011). Third, the low tariff rate tends to attract low 
quality installations mostly produced by state-owned enterprises. It does not provide an 
attractive alternative for most private, export-oriented enterprises that focus on markets 
offering high returns for high quality panels, mostly in Europe and the US. 
The policy path in China reflects a conflict between low cost and rapid deployment. While 
the early auctions for solar PV generation support enabled low tariff levels, they were 
incompatible with the country’s state-driven economic system and corresponding 
institutional weaknesses. Incomplete installations of low quality were the frequent 
outcome of projects appointed according to auctions. At first, the newly installed FIT 
appears to focus on rapidly compensating the weaker and often state-backed enterprises of 
the sector for a slowing global demand (Solarbuzz 2011). A high level of investor interest 
indicates that the FIT might indeed be able to accelerate deployment to meet defined 
                                                            
6  Interviews conducted by Doris Fischer in Shanghai, November 2011. Non-disclosure agreements do not 
allow for the publication of names of interviewees. 
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targets. In the long run, low FIT rates force firms to exploit economies of scale, and the 
size of China’s domestic market enables them to do so. This approach is in line with 
industrial development in China in general (Zeng / Williamson 2007) and could thus 
prepare an effective and efficient roll-out of solar PV in the country. 
4 India: transformation through competition 
The expansion of India’s strongly subsidized, coal-based electricity sector has provided 
the country with affordable electric power, thereby facilitating the country’s social and 
economic development. Within a decade, installed capacity increased from 109 GW to 
over 176 GW in 2009 (EIA 2011; IEA 2011, 598). Hydro and wind energy have already 
come to play a more important role in the country’s electricity portfolio, solar PV 
provided a mere 119 MW in 2011, most of it off-grid (MNRE 2011a). Fossil-fuel based 
technologies continue to constitute the lion’s share – about 67 % – of the electricity 
system’s capacity (IEA 2011, 598).  
Electricity prices are a politically sensitive issue in India. About a quarter of the 
population still had no access to electricity in 2010 (IEA 2010). Maintaining and 
expanding access to affordable energy is, therefore, a primary strategy to alleviate poverty. 
Rising electricity prices would be a hard blow for politicians seeking re-election and for 
citizens, many of whom still suffer from widespread poverty. Poor households strongly 
depend on affordable electricity. Consequently, in order to avoid passing on increased 
costs of electricity generation to customers, tariffs are highly subsidized, with electricity 
prices averaging about 0.065€/kWh7 in 2008 (Government of India 2011a, 262). At the 
same time, tight governmental budgets make it difficult to justify extensive support 
schemes for RETs. In addition, India’s electricity system suffers from frequent power 
outages, and the steadily increasing demand is likely to aggravate this situation 
(Government of India 2011a, 262). To address these challenges, the Indian government is 
determined to tap the country’s rich renewable resources, particularly the most abundant 
one, solar energy (Government of India 2010; Planning Commission 2008, 386).  
A new focus on solar energy 
To overcome the country’s electricity challenge, the Indian government seeks to double 
installed RET capacity over the next decade, with solar PV playing a significant role in 
this. By 2022, the government aims for an on-grid electricity capacity of 465 GW (MNRE 
2011b, 23). The Jawaharlal Nehru National Solar Mission (hereafter, Solar Mission), part 
of India’s National Action Plan on Climate Change launched in 2008 (Singh 2008), set the 
target of an on-grid solar PV capacity of 10GW until 2022. The government expects these 
targets to be sufficient in making solar PV cost-competitive by the time the Solar Mission 
is completed (Government of India 2010, 1; MNRE 2010, 19). If these targets are 
achieved, solar PV would constitute about 4 % of the electricity generation capacity 
installed between 2008 and 2022. 
                                                            
7  Average domestic electricity tariffs vary between 3 and 6 INR/kWh; one state has an extremely low 
tariff of about 0.8 INR/kWh (Government of India 2011a, 262). Annual exchange rate (2011), applied 
here and in the following: 1EUR=64.8818INR (European Central Bank 2012). 
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Although deployment of solar panels is still at a low level, an export-oriented 
manufacturing sector has already emerged, and the government is eager to proactively 
support its development. In 2009, more than 1 GW of solar panels were produced in India 
(Arora et al. 2010, 43–44). Similar to China, this industry emerged despite negligible 
domestic demand. The industry also suffers a strong dependence on imports of raw 
materials and components, in particular silicon wafers, which are essential to produce 
solar panels (Government of India 2010, 5). While competition from Chinese manu-
facturers is stiff, advancing the solar PV industry and securing a larger share of the global 
market for solar panels is one of the declared objectives of India’s Solar Mission (MNRE 
2010, 19). 
Failure of a feed-in tariff 
Past policy endeavours, including a nation-wide FIT, have largely been unable to 
stimulate investment in solar PV projects. A range of policies were explored at the 
national and regional level before 2010. For example, the country’s 10th Five-Year 
Plan (2002–2007) set a modest target of 5 MW in solar PV installations, but only 1 
MW was attained (Planning Commission 2008, 387). As a reaction to the 11th Five-
Year Plan (2007–2012), which prescribed a more ambitious target of 50 MW, the 
Ministry of New and Renewable Energy (MNRE) chose to establish its first FIT. The 
tariff was capped according to the set target (50 MW) and offered a compensation of 
0.178€/kWh, which was to be paid for a period of 10 years (Government of India 
2008). However, it provided too little incentive for private investors and led to no new 
installations (Arora et al. 2010, 40).  
Determined to achieve the targets set out in the 11th Five-Year Plan and the Solar 
Mission, the MNRE prepared a new tariff scheme with stronger incentives in 2010. 
In comparison to the previous policy, the tariff offered was raised significantly to 
about 0.276€/kWh. In addition, the guaranteed duration for which all generated 
electricity would be bought was extended to 25 years (Arora et al. 2010, 40). At the 
same time, the MNRE in turn arranged to appoint limited capacities in different 
rounds, which if reached, as happened later, would be allocated according to the 
lowest bids (MNRE 2009, 7). This approach practically meant switching to an ABT. 
For a start, two bidding rounds were foreseen, one for 2010 (150 MW), the other for 
2011 (350 MW). 
Making tenders work for India 
To increase the viability of supported solar PV projects and to discourage adventurous 
bids, the new policy includes various selection criteria, bidding fees and financial 
penalties. First, support is limited to commercially proven technologies, and bidders 
are obliged to submit a transmission agreement from the respective regional utility. 
Second, in order to discourage unviable bids, the potential project developers have to 
pay higher bidding fees the lower their offers are. For a 5 MW project, the fees range 
from about 800€ for projects more than 10 % below the ceiling price (0.276€/kWh) 
and up to about 4,000€ for projects offering more than a 25 % discount. Third, 
applicants to the scheme are required to provide considerable performance guarantees 
of approximately 232,000€ per 5 MW project, or 46,400€/MW. These guarantees are 
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to be forfeited in parts or even fully in case accepted projects are not realized (MNRE 
2009, 7–8). 
In addition, the selection criteria of the ABT have important implications for the industry. 
For one thing, only projects of specific sizes are supported. In the first round, they must 
equal about 5 MW, and each applicant is allowed to apply only once. In the second round, 
this requirement is loosened. Project sizes must be multiples of 5 MW but can amount to 
up to 20 MW, with each applicant being allowed to apply for a number of projects up to a 
total sum of 50 MW. Local content requirements also oblige developers to source specific 
modules and appliances from Indian manufacturers. Projects approved in the first round 
are only obliged to attain crystalline silicon modules from domestic manufacturers. 
However, in the second round, developers must rely exclusively on appliances 
manufactured in India, with the exception of thin-film modules (MNRE 2009; MNRE 
2011c, 7–8). 
Project developers competing for support 
The first two rounds for solar PV projects attracted wide-spread interest and resulted in 
offers significantly below the starting price, which generated concern that projects 
would not be financially viable. The overall volume of bids submitted in the first 
round amounted to 1,815 MW, way beyond the 150 MW on offer (MNRE 2011d, 12). 
Thus, the projects were selected on the basis of the offered generation prices, resulting 
in winning bids of 0.166 to 0.193€/kWh, discounts of between 30 and 40 % of the 
original ceiling price (Prabhu 2011). The second round, in 2011, which appointed 
another 350 MW, resulted in even lower tariffs. Ranging from 0.134 to 0.146€/kWh, 
these generation prices mirrored the quick decline of production costs of solar panels 
(Bridge to India 2011; Government of India 2011c). Doubts regarding the financial 
viability of projects due to the low tariffs (e. g. Prabhu 2011) have not been confirmed. 
In July 2011, the Indian government announced that 29 of the 30 projects selected in 
the first round had been able to secure the necessary financing (Government of India 
2011b). The first solar PV projects funded under the Solar Mission have already been 
set up; the precise number, however, is not clear (Government of India 2011c; MNRE 
2011e).  
All of India’s attempts to provide generation-based incentives for solar PV have been 
dominated by concerns over policy costs. The government’s keen interest in solar PV 
became apparent with the institutionalization of a FIT in 2008. The cost concern was 
evident from the low rates and short duration the FIT offered. As policymakers 
realized the ineffectiveness of such low incentives, they increased them. To limit and 
minimize policy costs, this time capacity caps were put in place and potential project 
developers had to submit competitive bids to gain support. This ABT determination 
allowed policymakers to secure a high degree of policy efficiency. Indeed, the only 
policy-inherent trade-offs to efficiency are the safeguards against financially unviable 
bids and some strategic policy design options such as eligible project sizes or local 
content requirements. While policymakers were clearly eager to attain defined 
deployment targets, rapid deployment clearly did not dictate their efforts. 
Contrastingly, concerns over policy costs have led to the failure of the FIT and 
encouraged policymakers to shift to an ABT. 
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5 South Africa: the cost of development 
South Africa’s economy has benefited greatly from the exploitation of its rich 
domestic coal reserves, upon which it based its electricity production (IEA 2011, 439–
440). Today, coal-fired plants contribute about 90 % to the country’s electricity 
capacity, which totalled 44 GW in 2008 (DOE 2011a; EIA 2011). This reliance on 
domestic coal reserves has allowed for the low electricity prices commonly identified 
as a major driver of the country’s rapid economic development (IEA 2011, 439; Pegels 
2010, 4947–4949). At the same time, around 25 % of South Africans still have no 
access to electricity (IEA 2010). In addition, with access expanding and on-grid 
demand increasing due to economic growth, South Africa’s electricity reserve margin 
fell below 10 % in 2008. The low reserve margin causes frequent power outages and 
impedes the conduct of necessary maintenance as only a small number of facilities can 
be taken from the grid simultaneously (Government of South Africa 2008). The 
government seeks to at least partly finance the upgrading of electricity generation and 
transmission facilities by increasing electricity prices. Having risen sharply, current 
prices amount to about 0.052€/kWh8, a level which is, however, insufficient to cover 
incurred costs. 
Getting away from coal 
South Africa has identified renewable energy as a key element to satisfy its future energy 
needs. This strategy crystallizes in the country’s second Integrated Resource Plan, which 
was published in 2010 and laid out a roadmap for the next 20 years (DOE 2011b). 
According to the plan, South Africa seeks to double its installed on-grid capacity by 
adding 45 GW of new installations, of which almost 20 % (8.4 GW) is expected to come 
from solar PV plants. Coal-based energy production is expected to contribute no more 
than 6.2 GW to the added capacity (DOE 2011b, 17). This plan constitutes a great shift in 
the country’s energy mix as there are currently no on-grid PV power plants in place, and 
off-grid applications are estimated to contribute a small amount of about 21 MW (Edkins 
et al. 2010, 4–5). 
The government recognizes the potential of solar PV to not only increase energy supply 
but also to support the country’s socio-economic development, instigate environmentally 
sustainable growth and develop the domestic solar PV industry (DOE 2011c). The 
industry objective in particular has been of limited success so far. With a capacity of about 
200 MW (Michaelson 2011), the country’s solar PV manufacturing industry hardly 
contributes a significant share to the global market.  
Renewable electricity in the political crossfire 
South African policymakers were eager to promote solar panels through an extensive FIT, 
which however stumbled over institutional and legal hurdles, and was later replaced by an 
ABT. In 2009, the National Energy Regulator of South Africa (NERSA) introduced a FIT 
for several RETs. On-grid solar PV installations received the most extensive support, 
                                                            
8  On February 28, 2011, Eskom switched to the 2011/2012 energy tariff, realizing a 25.8 % increase from 
the previous year: 0.523 Rand/kWh (ESKOM 2011). The annual exchange rate (2011) applied here and 
in the following was 1EUR = 10.2035ZAR (European Central Bank 2012).  
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amounting to 0.426€/kWh (NERSA 2011, 14). The rates set were welcomed by the 
industry at first, but high expectations were soon dampened. The monopolistic, state-
owned electricity provider Electricity Supply Commission (ESKOM), refused its 
support as it feared being burdened with the additional cost and thought its own 
monopolistic position might be undermined (Conrad / Fernandez / Houshyani 2011, 
36–39). In addition, the national treasury objected to the policy as it felt that FITs 
would neither minimize the cost to the customer nor appoint capacities on a 
competitive basis. In the course of fierce, intra-governmental struggles that lasted for 
about two years, the tariff rates were first significantly reduced, and later the 
implementation of the FIT was put on hold. The introduction of a tendering system in 
2011, known as Independent Power Producer (IPP) Procurement Programme, is 
broadly regarded as ousting the previous FIT initiative (Pegels 2011). 
Auctions, but the price tag doesn’t take centre stage 
The auction-based IPP programme appoints capacities for renewable electricity projects in 
five batches from 2011 through 2016, whereby projects have to undergo a thorough 
selection process. Out of the policy’s total volume of 3.7 GW, 1.45 GW are to come from 
solar PV. The winning bids, which have to be below the ceiling of 0.283€/kWh, then 
receive the tariff they offered for a guaranteed duration of 25 years (DOE 2011c).  
Because electricity provision is a highly political issue in South Africa, policymakers 
place great store on the IPP policy’s contribution to socio-economic development. 
Extensive selection criteria, which dilute the relevance of the price bids, are included 
to this end. The IPP selection process involves two rounds. Passing the first round 
requires bidders to prove that they have either a track-record in raising funds or 
sufficient financial means to conduct the proposed project. In addition, the technology 
intended to be used must have been utilized commercially at least twice. Applicants 
also need to submit an energy resource assessment of their chosen location along with 
a comprehensive generation forecast. Furthermore, a local content requirement has to 
be fulfilled, which demands a 40 % share of a South African entity, such as an 
enterprise, in the project. Eligible projects range in size anywhere between 1 and 
75 MW. In the second round, projects are rated on their contribution to economic 
development according to a fixed process. This process builds on the Broad-Based 
Black Economic Empowerment Act, a response to the country’s apartheid regime that 
lasted until 1994. Variables include the number of jobs created, the proportion of 
employees from formerly disadvantaged ethnic groups, and local community 
ownership. These criteria strengthen the local content requirements of the first round. 
A maximum of 30 points can be achieved for all non-price variables together, while up 
to 70 additional points are granted according to the generation price offered. Project 
bids with the highest point score win the tender (DOE 2011c). 
South African policymakers use a similar strategy as India’s regulators to deter 
adventurous bids and their consequences: bidders that pass the selection process have to 
provide a performance guarantee of about 20,000€/MW, and this guarantee is forfeited if 
developers do not comply with defined milestones or regulation (DOE 2011c). 
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Rome wasn’t built in a day 
Despite reduced expectations after the initial FIT was cancelled, investors showed great 
interest in the government’s first IPP call for bids in early 2011. The government received 
a total of 53 bids out of which 28 were admitted to the scheme, including 18 solar PV 
projects worth almost 632 MW. With regards to the 2016 objective of 1.45 GW, more 
than 40 % of the targeted solar PV capacity was thus already assigned in the first of five 
scheduled bidding rounds. Government officials are confident that winning project 
developers will be successful in securing financing, for which they have until June 2012 
(DOE 2011d; Flak 2011). A commitment by the state-owned Industrial Development 
Corporation, a development financier, to fund 12 of the 28 winning projects supports these 
expectations (Creamer 2011).  
South African policymakers had to develop a comprehensive generation-based policy 
within the limitations of the country’s legal and institutional framework. At first, 
government officials sought to put their country at the forefront in RET deployment with a 
well-resourced FIT scheme. However, the implementation of a scheme that does not pay 
primary attention to efficiency appeared to be legally and institutionally unfeasible. The 
consequent adoption of an ABT circumvented these difficulties. As in India, policymakers 
integrated local content requirements and safeguards against adventurous bids. While both 
can have an adverse effect on competition and efficiency, the latter facilitates the 
attainment of deployment targets. In addition, stringent social criteria, which make project 
implementation more costly, are part of the new ABT (Engineering News 2012). These 
politically prescribed selection-criteria limit policymakers’ space for manoeuvring. Within 
this space, however, the policy choice is focused on reaching set targets at the lowest 
possible cost. 
6 Promoting renewable electricity production under conditions of scarcity 
With electricity as a key facilitator of development, all three countries face the challenge 
of an ever-increasing electricity demand and the need to overcome an unsustainable 
reliance on fossil fuels, which is intensified by the central role affordable electricity plays 
for economic and social development – and the goal of universal access to electricity, 
which in particular remains a substantial challenge in India and South Africa. Mature 
fossil-fuel based electricity technologies paired with domestic resource abundance and/or 
low resource prices have led the three countries to heavily rely on coal. However, a rising 
awareness of the non-sustainability of fossil-fuel based electricity systems and of the 
economic, environmental and social uncertainties they entail has led all three to reassess 
their electricity strategies.  
So far, solar PV has contributed little to the electricity mix in China, India, and South 
Africa. In recent years, however, with an intensified focus on renewable energy, all three 
countries have defined ambitious objectives to increase the share of solar PV in their 
electricity mix. While India aims for 10 GW installed solar PVs until 2022, which 
constitutes 4 % of the capacity to be added, China targets 50 GW until 2020, and South 
Africa plans for 8.4 GW until 2016, equalling about 7 and 20 % of the planned capacity 
additions, respectively. 
Promoting renewable electricity generation in emerging economies 
German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE) 15 
The role of priorities and experimenting in shaping renewable electricity policy 
In their more recent eagerness to expand the deployment of solar PV, policymakers in 
China, India, and South Africa have experimented with different policy approaches to deal 
with the strong cost pressures in their electricity sectors. These pressures arise from a 
common understanding that affordable electricity is a cornerstone of economic and social 
development. This understanding makes it politically and economically difficult to burden 
electricity consumers with the additional costs of an early transition to renewable energy 
sources. In China, the government was convinced of the effectiveness of a FIT, but it 
would not implement the tariff on a national scale until the lowest feasible price was 
determined through a number of project-specific tenders. Similarly, India instituted a FIT 
for solar PV in 2007. However, the tariff level and duration that policymakers agreed upon 
were not sufficient to attract any significant investment. Indian policymakers accepted the 
need to increase incentives if they were to successfully foster investment in solar PV, so a 
more extensive ABT was introduced to minimize the policy’s financial burden on tax 
payers. South African policymakers were determined to facilitate the rapid deployment of 
solar PV by introducing a FIT scheme with strong incentives in 2009. However, its 
introduction stumbled over institutional and legal hurdles, which require a scheme that 
minimizes costs to society. Consequentially, the FIT was switched to an ABT. The South 
African policy is unlikely, however, to attain a tariff as low as in China or India due the 
strong social objectives integrated into the policy to add to the deployment target. This 
effect thus cannot be considered a drawback of the scheme. 
Even under different policy schemes, the strong focus on policy costs does not seem to be 
an inevitable pitfall to the effectiveness in reaching government-defined deployment 
targets. Generation-based policies with low tariffs, capacity caps and/or competitive bids 
limit the number of solar PV projects eligible and feasible in the three emerging 
economies. The policies are therefore unlikely to accelerate deployment as much as the 
successful FITs in several European countries. However, as the Indian example showed, 
FITs can very well fail when policymakers are not willing or able to commit to a sufficient 
tariff level. Or as in South Africa, legal frameworks might hinder their implementation. 
The two countries now have ABTs, which they successfully apply in ways that 
compensate for the risks of adventurous and unviable bids (i. e., through sanctions and 
bidding fees). They are thus on a good track to reaching their deployment targets. China, 
on the other hand, instituted a FIT for solar PVs that was regarded as too low to be 
financially attractive and in addition misses important design features, particularly a 
guaranteed duration. Nevertheless, it seems to be suited to the country’s economic and 
political situation. Investors are eagerly taking up the Chinese government’s offer and 
deployment numbers thus increase successfully. 
Two major side-effects of the policy designs that strongly focus on low-cost deployment 
are worth mentioning here. First, the low FIT in China and the fierce competitive bidding 
in India and South Africa lead to a concentration of installations in sun-rich regions that 
may be far away from the main areas of electricity use. This outcome is not necessarily 
problematic; however, it is an issue that future research should look into. Second, all three 
policy schemes are favourable for large firms interested in investing in solar PV. This is 
realized through the choice of ABTs, low FIT rates and/or explicit selection criteria. There 
is indeed good reason for emerging economies to explicitly employ such a large-firm 
focus. For one thing, emerging countries have a competitive advantage in low labour 
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costs, which facilitates the exploitation of economies of scale in production. For another, 
economies of scale in research and development constitute a strong argument for 
technological late-comer countries to encourage large investments and the participation 
of established firms. A strong industry focus is clearly visible in all country cases: 
China’s FIT emerged as a response to export difficulties that solar PV manufacturers 
experienced due to a slowing global demand for solar PV. India’s Solar Mission was 
clearly aimed at strengthening previously underdeveloped parts of the national solar PV 
value chain. South Africa, which has a rather small manufacturing industry, focused its 
efforts on the project level. 
7 Conclusion and outlook 
Following the country cases and the discussion, we draw two major conclusions. 
First, the three examined countries engage in policy experimentation defined by high cost 
pressures and a strong industry focus, unlike the policies in many European countries, 
where climate change concerns and a subsequent focus on rapid deployment often 
dominates. As such, China, India, and South Africa reviewed FITs and ABTs and more or 
less gradually adapted them to their specific needs and objectives. 
Second, despite sidestepping success factors of generation-based policies identified in 
Europe, the three emerging economies are effectively working towards their deployment 
targets. China’s example shows how a policy that lacks elementary design features, 
particularly guaranteed durations, still works due to the specific structure of its economic 
system. In particular, the soft budget constraints that many government-related companies 
face undermined the feasibility of auctions in determining tariff rates. Like India, which 
adopted auctions to limit policy costs by fostering competition, South Africa managed to 
design auctions in ways that largely avoid financially unviable bids, thus allowing both 
countries to successfully support the deployment of RETs. 
Altogether, we conclude that countries can experiment with different schemes, arrive at 
different solutions and still be effective in achieving defined targets. However, the 
experience of China, India, and South Africa in encouraging deployment of solar PV 
through generation-based policies is very recent. After a period of experimentation, signs 
are positive that the three countries have arrived at policies that are effective in reaching 
defined targets. It remains to be seen what capacity will eventually be installed and 
connected to the grid. Only then can policies be evaluated conclusively. As solar PV 
technology is still in a phase of fast-paced development, it will be of high interest to see 
how countries adapt policies to changing technological and economic conditions. 
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